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ABSTRACT 
This study is an attempt to examine empirically the association between 
socio-economic measures of deprivation—such as food insecurity, landlessness, 
unemployment, and human under-development—and the incidence of violent 
conflict as measured by  the number of violent attacks across districts in 
Pakistan.  The study uses a linear probability model in which the dependent 
variable is defined on the basis of the presence or absence of violent attacks in a 
particular district. The results of the study indicate that in addition to the 
provincial-level fixed characteristics, landlessness and food insecurity are 
positively and robustly associated with the probability of violent attacks across 
districts in Pakistan. Quite contrary to the general impression held, the number 
of madrassahs (religious seminaries), employment rate, and literacy rate appear 
to be statistically irrelevant, on average, in terms of determining the probability 
of the presence of violent conflict across districts in Pakistan. While 
emphasising the need to collect better data on the intensity of violent conflict—
to take into account both the incidence as well as the origin of violent attacks 
across districts in Pakistan—the study raises some important questions regarding 
the role of landlessness and food insecurity that need to be investigated further 
in future studies on socio-economic drivers of violent conflict in Pakistan. 
 
JEL classification:  O29, D63, D74, F52 






1.  INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
* 
Violent conflicts have emerged as one of the most crucial and urgent 
humanitarian and development concerns of present day developing world. These 
conflicts impose huge costs that are not only restricted to generating human 
misery and insecurity in the short run but also extend in terms of having adverse 
consequences on the structure of economy, polity and society in the long run. 
Like many other developing countries, Pakistan’s history is also marked 
by the presence of various sorts of violent conflicts. These may be classified as 
sectarian, ethnic, religious or nationalistic insurgencies. During the past one 
decade or so however—particularly after Pakistan became a key ally of the 
United States o f America in  its ‘War on Terror’—the incidence of  violent 
conflict in Pakistan has reached serious proportions, not witnessed earlier in its 
entire history. The death toll from violent conflict that includes sectarian 
violence and terrorism has been on an upward trend for the past couple of years. 
According to Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies [PIPS (2009)], the total number 
of armed attacks in Pakistan increased from 254 in 2005 to 3816 in 2009 (a 15 
fold increase between 2005 and 2009) with the death toll rising from 216 to 
12,815 during the same reference period.   As a result of the ongoing armed 
conflict in the North-Western and tribal regions of Pakistan, the country 
experienced one of the worst displacements of people in 2009.  According to a 
recent study published in the Norwegian Refugee Council, around three million 
people were displaced internally in Pakistan and this has been one of the greatest 
displacements of people in the world.1 
The economic costs that include direct as well as indirect costs are huge 
and a ccording to an estimate by  the Government of Pakistan, these costs 
represent around 5.1 percent of the GDP.
2   Many of these costs such as the 
distortion in the international image of the country and the anxiety and stress 
experienced by the common men and women due to rising physical insecurity 
are intangible and almost irreversible.  The incidence of violent conflict and the 
associated costs also impinge on the achievement of MDG goals that are vital in 
terms of human development and poverty eradication.  
                                                                   
Acknowledgements: The author is extremely grateful to Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies 
(PIPS), Islamabad for providing the relevant data and answering all queries patiently. 
1http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64G4LP20100517 accessed on May, 24, 2010. 
2PRSP II, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. Direct costs include loss of human 
lives and injuries; value of property or infrastructure destroyed or damaged; costs of enhanced 
spending on security. Indirect costs include costs of greater uncertainty and risk perceptions; higher 
transaction costs; and psychological costs.  2 
Despite such severe socio-economic repercussions of the ongoing violent 
conflict in Pakistan, there has been a dearth of systematic studies that explore 
the key drivers of violent conflict in Pakistan.  Most of the evidence in this 
direction is anecdotal and mostly relates to the international relations and 
political science literature.  Many of these studies  [see e.g. Abbas  (2004)] 
suggest that the formation of the violent militant groups in Pakistan can be 
traced back to the cold war era when this political force, known as  ‘Afghan 
Mujahideen’ at that time, was mobilised by the U.S. and Pakistan to fight 
against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly another popular and 
important explanation of the growth of radicalisation and the associated violence 
in Pakistan is that during 1977-87, commonly referred to as the  ‘Zia era’, a 
systematic right-wing orientation of the society w as achieved deliberately 
through a number of legal and administrative policy measures [see e.g. Aftab 
(2008)]. Many analysts argue however, that despite the gradual radicalisation of 
Pakistan’s society and body politic during Zia era and afterwards, the radical 
elements in the society did not indulge in violent activities of the sort witnessed 
today that includes suicide bombings at public as well as private places on a 
frequent basis. Moreover, the level of organisation that these violent groups 
have achieved today—as reflected by the establishment of parallel systems of 
government on vast array of state territory—is also unprecedented in the history 
of this country. Many analysts argue that the seeds of this violent radicalisation 
were sown right after the Government of Pakistan became a key ally of the 
United States in its  ‘War against Terrorism.’ In this sense, the growing 
radicalisation of Pakistan’s society is seen by many as a reaction to western 
imperialism that continues to date in one form or the other.  Observations such 
as these that trace the political and ideological roots of radicalisation are critical 
to understand t he formation of  violent militant groups in Pakistan.  Yet they 
offer only a partial explanation of the recent growth of religious militancy and 
violent conflict in Pakistan. There are important socio-economic factors that 
must also be analysed in order to address the root causes of present violent 
conflict in Pakistan. 
As a matter of fact, conflict is a complex phenomenon and the root causes 
may relate to multiple factors that may include grievances of the perpetrators of 
violence; ideological hegemony of a particular group of population; political 
exclusion; socio-economic inequality; lack of social justice; and poor 
governance including the weak capacity of institutions responsible for 
maintaining law and order. In Pakistan too, the sources of violent conflict may 
be traced to a confluence of factors that may transcend from socio-economic to 
geo-strategic and political factors. While recognising the role and significance of 
each of these factors, the present study examines this important subject from the 
lens of a development economist and investigates the role of socio-economic 
factors in promoting the incidence of violence. More specifically, the study 3 
conducts a descriptive as well as an empirical investigation of the role of human 
deprivation, food insecurity and the absence of land ownership in mobilising 
support for violent conflict.  
The study is organised as follows. The next  Section 2  presents a brief 
review of the major  hypotheses and arguments in the literature regarding the 
sources of violent conflict in the developing world. The review draws insights 
from both cross-country as well as within country studies. Studies in the context of 
Pakistan are also reviewed so as to provide the justification and theoretical basis of 
our study. In particular, we provide evidence and arguments on why we include 
variables such as food insecurity and landlessness in our study on violent conflict 
in Pakistan.   Section 3 presents the empirical methods of analysis and sources of 
data. Section 4 presents insights from the descriptive analysis of our data. Section 
5 presents the estimation results whereas Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the key drivers of 
conflict across countries. There are various explanations that vary from country 
to country and the context in which conflict is defined and analysed. Most of 
these explanations fall under either the ‘Greed’ or the ‘Grievance’ hypothesis 
[see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (2004)]. According to the ‘Greed’ hypothesis, it is 
the economic opportunity and the ability to finance armed rebellion that is the 
key driver of conflict. Financial viability of rebel groups, and not grievances or 
hatred according to Collier 2006, is the key factor that increases the risk of 
violent conflict. The possible sources of finance according to Paul and Collier, et  
al. (2001), are foreign governments, diasporas , and natural resources. Conflict 
driven by ‘greed’ mostly occurs in societies with an abundance of natural 
resources, dependence upon the export of primary commodities and the presence 
of large diasporas.  
The ‘Grievance’ hypothesis on the other hand, attributes conflict to the 
grievances of certain groups of population that are marginalised on the basis of 
religion, ethnicity or caste etc. These grievances are generally political in nature 
and conflict on this basis mostly occur in societies where political m eans to seek 
redress are limited. An important thesis similar to the ‘Grievance’ hypothesis is 
advanced by Stewart (2002) who provides anecdotal as well as empirical 
evidence to show that it is the ‘horizontal inequalities’ and the ‘failure of social 
contract’ between the state and the citizens that lie at the heart of most violent 
conflicts across the developing world. Horizontal inequalities as defined by 
Stewart are inequalities—that may be measured across various dimensions such 
as economic, political and social—between culturally defined groups. These 
groups may be defined on the basis of geographical affiliation, gender, religion, 
class, caste or language etc. This is different from vertical inequality that 
measures inequality between individuals irrespective of their affiliation with a 4 
particular group. According to this view, imbalanced development that involves 
sharp horizontal inequalities (group differences) is an important cause of conflict 
across the developing world. Stewart also links the root causes of conflict in 
some of the developing countries to the failure of social contract  [Stewart 
(2002b)]. According to this view, the relationship between state and the citizens 
is based upon a social contract in which citizens accept state authority as long as 
it provides public services and reasonable economic conditions. A worsening of 
economic conditions and the breakdown of social services may result in conflict. 
In this context, many studies argue that even if poverty, deprivation, 
inequality and the failure of social contract do not drive conflict directly, the 
presence of these conditions are very likely to fuel conflict by mobilising 
support. In other words, the risks of conflict may exacerbate due to the presence 
of these conditions thereby increasing the vulnerability of countries to conflict. 
In Nepal for instance, poverty, social exclusion and landlessness have been 
identified as the major drivers of mobilising support for violent groups. 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003) argue that Nepal does not have many natural 
resources which can be captured, thereby ruling out the ‘Greed’ hypothesis as 
the basis for violent conflict. What is more evident—the author argues—is the 
presence of social exclusion and economic exclusion on the basis of caste and 
ethnicity. The lower castes are mostly concentrated in the hills and Terai and 
these communities have strongly supported the Maoists insurgents in Nepal. 
According to the study, landlessness is found to be highly correlated with the 
intensity of the rebellion. Similarly, Do and Iyer (2009) examined detailed data 
set on conflict related deaths by districts in Nepal and find that these deaths are 
significantly higher in poorer district and in geographical locations that favour 
insurgents such as mountains and forests. More specifically, they find that a 10 
percentage point increase in poverty is associated with 25–27 additional 
conflict-related deaths. Similarly, Douma (2006) presents the case of Sub 
Saharan Africa where poverty, relative deprivation, political exclusion and the 
failure of social contract between the ruling elite and their constituencies turn 
out to be the key drivers of conflict. Using household level data on Uganda, 
Deininger (2003) also finds evidence on the lack of economic development as 
one of the major factors contributing to the incidence of civil strife. 
A related argument in this direction is that the risk of c onflict is 
determined by the opportunity cost of joining an armed rebellion. Individuals 
weigh up their costs that include foregone income from other income earning 
activities and the benefits of joining up the armed rebellion. If the opportunity 
costs are very low, the likelihood of individuals joining a violent conflict 
movement is very high.  
As a matter of fact, the drivers of conflict vary from region to region. 
Studies conducted in the context of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle 
East, for instance, do not find any evidence on poverty or lack of education 5 
driving conflict. Kruger and Maleckova (2003) for instance find no relationship 
between education or economic background and participation in terrorism in the 
Middle East. Utilising data from  a public opinion poll conducted in the West 
Bank and Gaza strip, the study finds no evidence of more highly educated 
individuals supporting less violence against Israeli targets.  
Similarly, Krueger and Laitin (2007) use US State Department’s data on 
international terrorism and analyse the socioeconomic and political profile of the 
country of origin of the terrorist and the target country of the terrorist event. In 
particular, the study focuses on two variables: GDP per capita and civil liberties 
in countries from where terrorists originate. The authors do not find any support 
for the theory that poverty leads to violence and arrive at the conclusion that 
GDP per capita is not a good predictor of the origins of terrorists. Instead, it is 
the individuals that come from politically repressed countries that lie behind 
international terrorism.  
World Bank (2004) conducted a study on the pattern and incidence of 
local conflict in Indonesia. Using data on Indonesia’s 69,000 villages, the study 
finds that poverty by itself has very little correlation with conflict in Indonesia. 
However, unemployment, natural disasters, changes in sources of income and 
clustering of ethnic groups within villages are found to be positively correlated 
with the incidence of conflict. A number of other studies, mostly conducted in a 
cross-country perspective do not lend support to the hypothesis that poverty and 
lack of education increase the propensity to participate in violence  [see e.g. 
Russel and Miller (1983); and Berrebi (2003)]. 
Another approach  to analyse the sources of conflict  emphasises the 
political and economic interests of the key actors of conflict. These actors/agents 
may derive benefits by using conflict to their own ends and these interests may 
very well be served by sustaining or perpetuating conflict. In Kyrgyzstan for 
instance, Post Soviet political elite that has used state apparatus for its own 
gains, has been identified as the major source of internal conflict [see e.g. DFID 
(2002)].  Ethnic and religious fractionalisation as well as ‘polarisation’ has also 
been found to contribute to violent conflict  [see e.g. Easterly and Levine 
(1997)]. Amongst other variables, certain geographic characteristics have been 
found to be relevant in explaining armed conflict. Mountains and forests, for 
instance, serve as good training and hideout sites for armed groups [see Paul and 
Collier, et  al.  (2001)].  
Summing up, conflict is a complex phenomenon for which there is no 
single explanatory framework. Various factors interact with each other to drive 
and sustain conflict. Given the multiplicity and divergence of existing evidence 
on key drivers of conflict, it is important to reconcile the evidence on the basis 
of the nature and context of conflict across different countries and regions of the 
world. It is also important to differentiate between within country and cross 
country evidence on the drivers of conflict, civil war and terrorism.  6 
Evidence in the Context of Pakistan 
 
In the context of Pakistan, there are only a few noteworthy studies that 
explore the nexus between socio-economic variables such as illiteracy and 
poverty on the one hand and religious militancy and current violent conflict on 
the other hand: Fair (2008) conducted a survey of 141 households of slain 
militants who died fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The data was collected 
in 2004 and focussed more on Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The study 
came up with two interesting findings: first, contrary to the general view held, 
the respondents were considerably more educated than the average population 
and second, an insignificant proportion (4 percent) attended madrassah schools 
suggesting that madrassahs were irrelevant to militant recruitments. The study 
however found unemployment to be extremely high among militants despite 
basic education. Aftab (2008) conducted a descriptive analysis of the spatial 
distribution of poverty in Pakistan and concluded that there was little evidence 
to suggest that  poverty, per say fuelled extremism. In order to support her 
contention, she argued that poverty had declined significantly between 2001 and 
2006. However, this had also been the period of  rising militancy and  violent 
conflict in Pakistan.  
Interestingly, in recent years, a few studies point to the possible 
connection between m easures of deprivation such as food insecurity and 
landlessness to violent conflict in Pakistan. The mediating factor that seems to 
link food insecurity and violent conflict is argued to be the poor governance or 
what Stewart (2002b) terms as the  ‘failure of social contract’ between the 
citizens and state. A recently released Report by Woodrow Wilson International 
Centre for Scholars on food insecurity in Pakistan  [Kugelman and Hathaway 
(2010)] provides convincing arguments and evidence on the critical nexus 
between food insecurity, governance and conflict both across countries and 
within the context of Pakistan. The Report argues that most countries in the 
world that are classified as food insecure in the world (both chronic and 
transitory) also suffer from   poor  governance and perform  poorly in World 
Bank’s worldwide governance indicators. The Report further argues that 30 of 
the 36 FAO’s designated food-insecure countries are included in the Failed 
States Index.  
In fact, food insecurity—particularly in the context of developing 
countries that are self-sufficient in the production of food such as Pakistan—is 
often rightly perceived as the problem of distribution and access rather than the 
non-availability of food. Corruption that includes hoarding of food supply and 
poor governance can very safely be taken as one of the root causes of food 
insecurity in Pakistan. Poor governance, grievances and marginalisation also 
leads to conflict [see Stewart (2002b)]. In the context of Pakistan, Kugelman and 
Hathaway (2010) utilise the conflict map of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA 
published by BBC Urdu service that identifies districts with respect to the 7 
degree of the presence of militants and provide evidence on the link between 
food insecurity and violent conflict. The Report argues that all districts and 
tribal agencies classified as having “Taliban Sronghold” have the worst level of 
food insecurity and are designated to be “extremely food insecure” by the FAO 
classification. These include North Waziristan, Shangla, South Waziristan, 
Orakzai, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, and Lower Dir. BBC has classified these conflict 
districts to be the ones not only with “Taliban stronghold” but also  as areas 
where the Pakistani government has completely lost its writ. Overall, out of 22 
conflict districts (that are either classified as  having “Taliban stronghold” or 
“Taliban presence”), 15 are extremely food insecure. Out of the nine 
“government controlled” districts, only two are found to be extremely food-
insecure. Furthermore, the report highlights the fact that the second most food 
insecure districts in Pakistan: Dera Bugti (in Balochistan), also happens to be the 
most conflict ridden districts in Pakistan. This, according to the Report, reveals a 
clear relationship between governance stress, food insecurity and conflict. While 
highlighting the social dimensions of food insecurity in Pakistan, the Report 
argues that conditions such as food insecurity and landlessness that lead to the 
marginalisation of the general population has certainly fuelled violent conflict.   
Lack of ownership of land also depicts an important form of economic 
marginalisation. The pattern of land ownership is highly skewed in Pakistan with 
the top 2.5 percent owning 40 percent of the land and nearly half of the rural 
households owning no land at all [Gazder (2003)]. In fact militant groups such as 
Taliban often exploit these insecurities of ordinary people to gain support. In the 
district of Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for instance, there have been reports of 
Taliban forcefully redistributing land [see Parlez and Shah (2009) and Kugelman, 
et al. (2010)]. People who are outraged by chronic hunger, lack of justice and poor 
governance are more likely to support violent conflict. Although studies such as 
the one  by Woodrow Wilson Centre,  reviewed above provide theoretical 
arguments and some statistics on the association between food insecurity, 
landlessness and violent conflict, there is no systematic study that tests the 
empirical validity of these arguments. The present study is an attempt to explore 
econometrically the association between these and other socio-economic factors 
and violent conflict in the context of Pakistan. 
 
3.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODS 
 
In order to investigate the association between socio-economic variables 
and violent conflict in Pakistan, we use a linear probability model in which we 
define a binary dependent variable based on the presence or absence of violent 
conflict across districts in Pakistan. More specifically let  yij  represent our 
outcome of interest in district j, then 
 
Yij  =  0 if there are no violent attacks in district j  
Yij  =  1 if there is one or more violent attacks in district j 8 
We also present the econometric results in which our dependent variable 
takes the following form  
 
Yij  =  0  if the number of people killed per 100,000 population =0  
Yij  =  1  if the number of people killed per 100,000 population is >0 
 
A Logit model of the following form is used:  
 
Yij= a + ßXi + ei 
 
Where Yij is a discrete random variable that measures the presence or absence of 
violent conflict in district j; a is the intercept parameter; Xj is a vector of socio-
economic and geographic characteristics at the district level. These variables 
include employment rate, literacy,  human development,  the number of 
madrassahs, land-ownership, food security as well as provincial dummies. The 
justification of using these variables and their sources are described in detail 
below. We have used pre-conflict socio-economic characteristics of the districts 
to avoid any possibility of reverse causation. 
 
3.1.  Measure of the Incidence of Conflict 
 
To measure the incidence of conflict, we have used data on the number of 
violent attacks in each district in  2009, as collected by Pakistan Institute of 
Policy Studies  [PIPS  (2009)].  The attacks include  incidents of a  terrorist, 
insurgent, and sectarian nature. We also use the number of people killed in these 
attacks by district. We recognise that this is an imperfect measure of conflict 
intensity as it relates more to the incidence of violent attacks and may not relate 
directly to the origin of these attacks or their perpetrators. There is definitely a 
dire need to map districts by the intensity of conflict—that takes into account 
not only the number of attacks but also the presence of violent militant and 
sectarian groups—so as to conduct a full-fledged analysis of the sources of 
violent conflict in Pakistan. However, within the limitation of data at this point, 
the present study is just one step towards examining the sources of the incidence 
of violent conflict across districts in Pakistan. Certainly, more comprehensive 
data on conflict is needed to answer some of the critical questions raised by our 
preliminary analysis. 
 




Our major socio-economic variables such as literacy rate, employment 
rate and landlessness rate at the district level are obtained from Pakistan Living 
Standards Measurement Survey  [PSLM  (2006-07)]. The literacy rate and 
employment rate are used in order to test the much disputed hypothesis in the 
conflict literature that it is the uneducated, unemployed and thereby frustrated 
youth that serves as the recruiting ground of militant organisations. The 9 
landlessness rate (percentage of households that do not own land) is not only a 
measure of material deprivation but it also reflects inequality in land ownership. 
In some specifications we also include another comprehensive measure of of 
socio-economic wellbeing, the Human Development Index (HDI) that is a 
weighted average of three indices comprising of GDP per capita, education and 
health. This index is computed at the district level by UNDP (2003). Data on 
district level population is based on projections from population census 
conducted by the Government of Pakistan.  
 
Number of Madrassahs and their Enrolment 
 
This variable is used to test whether or not  religious seminaries 
commonly referred to as madrassahs are relevant to militant recruitments. Data 
for the number of  madrassahs and their enrolment at the district level is 
obtained from the census of education conducted in 2004-05 by the Academy of 




The World Food Pogramme  [WFP  (2003)] has classified districts 
according to the food security zones in which they fall. The following five zones 
have been classified according to the situation in terms  of food insecurity: 




 In order to control for provincial level fixed characteristics, we also 
include provincial dummies. 










Pakhtunkhwa   Balochistan   Punjab   Sindh  Landless 
Food 
Insecurity 
Attack Dummy  1               
Killed Dummy  0.8795  1             
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  0.3029  0.3108   1           
Balochistan   0.2343  0.2301   –0.3263  1         
Punjab  –0.2824  –0.1888  –0.4252  –0.3641  1       
Sindh  –0.2587  –0.3762  –0.293  –0.2509  –0.327  1     
Landless  –0.0105  –0.0788  –0.5261  0.1295  0.1198  0.3244  1   
Food Insecurity  0.3461  0.3862   0.3235  0.2412  –0.5263  0.0042  –0.248  1 
No. of Madrassahs 
(per 100,000 
Population)  0.1931  0.2092   0.5582  –0.2381  –0.0897  –0. 2819  –0.3773   0.1311 
Employment Rate  –0.1748  –0.1679  –0.5257  0.2316  0.0574  0.2902  0.2716   –0.147 
Adult Literacy  –0.1036  –0.1068  –0.0612  –0.404  0.4947  –0.0951  0.1454   –0.4894 
HDI  –0.2138  –0.2505  –0.1893  –0.2427  0.4487  –0.0638  0.2522   –0.5919 10 
 
No. of Madrassahs (per 
100,000 population)  Employment  Adult Literacy  HDI 
No. of Madrassahs (per 
100,000 Population)  1       
Employment Rate  –0.2172  1     
Adult Literacy  0.0693  –0.3749  1   
HDI  –0.1116  –0.1004  0.7179  1 
 
3.3.  Some Data Caveats 
Before proceeding to report t he estimation results, it is pertinent to 
highlight some data caveats. First, data on conflict intensity, either defined by 
the number of violent attacks or the presence of certain conditions and factors 
that promote such attacks is extremely limited. We have made an attempt in this 
study to make the best use of whatever data was available. We cannot rule out 
the possibility of measurement errors with respect to data collected. Improved 
data on these and other related variables is extremely crucial to conduct policy 
oriented research studies in this area. The present study takes this opportunity to 
highlight the significance of compiling such data.  
Second, district level data on some important socio-economic variables 
such as poverty and human development i s limited. We have used Pakistan 
Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM, 2006-07) to obtain data on most 
of the socio-economic variables at the district level. For FATA and FANA, such 
data is not available due to which we had to exclude these geographical areas 
that are nevertheless important in the context of ongoing conflict in Pakistan. 
The  exclusion of these areas is likely to create a downward bias  in the 
coefficient estimates of socio-economic variables.  This is because these are the 
areas that have the highest intensity of conflict and at the same time have one of 
the poorest human development indicators. FATA continues to be one of the 
least developed regions in Pakistan with more than 60 percent of the population 
living below the poverty line [ICG (2009)]. Its maternal mortality rate at 600 per 
100,000 live births is nearly twice the national average.  A history of economic 
and political neglect of the region by the state as well as the lack of provision of 
public services and economic opportunity has been widely cited as one of the 
major factors contributing to the rise of militancy and violent conflict in FATA 
[see e.g ICG (2009)]. The majority of the population rely on subsistence farming 
or cross-border trade with Afghanistan. With meagre employment opportunities 
available, the opportunity cost of those who offer their services for militancy is 
low. According to one estimate the militants’ recruits receive a monthly salary 
of around Rs 15,000 on average that is much higher than the prevailing salary in 
many other occupations in FATA [ICG (2000)]. Due to these observations, one 
may suggest that the inclusion of FATA and FANA districts in our analysis may 
strengthen the contention that poverty and lack of human development may have 
resulted in fuelling the violent conflict.   11 
Third, some of the socio-economic variables such as poverty and food 
insecurity may be endogenous to conflict in the sense that conflict may not only 
stem from, but may also exacerbate poverty and food insecurity. We have tried 
to circumvent this problem by using pre-conflict socio-economic variables 
where available.  
Last but not least, the relationship between socio-economic variables and 
violent conflict may not be causal if there are other factors that drive both socio-
economic deprivation and violent conflict. Needless to mention, the analyse s of 
political and geostrategic drivers of conflict are also outside the purview of the 
present study. This does not imply by any means that we discount the role of 
these important factors. 
 
4.  INSIGHTS FROM DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1.  Summary Statistics   
Originally we had around  101 districts on which data on conflict 
incidence was available. However, after the i nclusion of all controls, we were 
left with 88 districts for which we report our results. Out of these, around 30 
districts have not experienced any attack during our reference period of 2009 
whereas 58 districts have experienced one or more attacks during the same 
period. The highest number of violent attacks took place in  Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa followed by Balochistan (see Figure 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Absolute Number of Violent Attacks in 2009 
 
Source: PIPS (2009). 12 
In terms of casualties, around 32 districts have a death toll of zero per 
100,000 population whereas the remaining 56 districts have a death toll of more 
than zero per 100,000 population.  Table 2  shows that  in conflict affected 
districts, adult literacy rate; net enrolment at primary level; as well as 
employment rate is lower, on average, than conflict free districts (with no 
violent attack in 2009). The average number of madrassahs and their enrolment 
is higher in conflict prone districts.  Similarly landlessness rate is higher,  on 
average, in conflict prone districts.  
 
Table 2 

















Districts with no Attack  49.5  61.6  56.3  0.51  40.1  104 
Districts with 1 or more 
Attacks  46.4  58  49.9  0.47  36.9  111 
Districts with Death 
Rate=0 (per 100,000 
Population)  45.2  56.1  54.9  0.51  40.2  94 
Districts with Death 
Rate>0 (per 100,000 
Population)  48.5  60.8  50.1  0.46  36.8  117 
 
While difference in terms of these socio-economic variables, between 
conflict-prone and conflict-free  districts is not really discernible in these 
summary statistics,  interestingly, the difference in terms of food insecurity is 
strikingly high: the average number of attacks is 14 in food secure districts 
compared to 23 in food insecure districts whereas the average number of people 
killed (per 100,000 population) in food secure districts is one half of that in food 
insecure districts (Table 3).   
 
Table 3 






Average No. of Attacks  23  14 
Average No of Attacks per 100,000 Population  4.6  1.2 
Average No. of People Killed per 100,000 
Population  3.2  1.6 
Number of Observations (N)  64  37 13 
5.  LOGIT MODEL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the regression results of our Logit model when our 
discrete dependent variable is defined on the basis of whether or not a particular 
district has experienced one or more attack in 2009. The sign of the coefficient 
of an explanatory variable depicts the direction in which the probability of 
violent attack increases/decreases as a result of an increase in the explanatory 
variable. The statistical significance of a variable in explaining the probability of 
violent attack is  shown by the t-values in parenthesis and is represented by 
asterisks in the table.  In column 1, we start out with the provincial level fixed 
characteristics as represented by provincial dummies; the landlessness rate; and 
food insecurity. The dummy  for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan stand out 
in terms of their statistical significance as well as their robustness. The positive 
signs on the coefficients of these provincial dummies indicate  that the 
probability of violent attacks in a particular district increases, on average, if the 
district happens to be located in  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan. This 
remains to be the case even when we include socio-econom ic variables in 
columns 2, 3, 4 and 5. This result highlights the significance of provincial level 
fixed characteristics in explaining violent conflict in Pakistan.  
 
Table 4 
Logit Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: Districts having 1 or more Attack (Yes=1; No=0) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Constant  –6.121**  –6.138**  –5.256*  –6.703  –3.324 
  (–3.19)  (–3.20)  (–2.04)  (–1.90)  (–0.82) 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  4.521***  4.118**  3.896*  3.972**  3.875* 
  (3.4)  (2.86)  (2.54)  (2.61)  (2.52) 
Balochistan  3.015**  2.973**  2.976**  3.074**  3.053** 
  (3.17)  (3.13)  (3.1)  (3.13)  2.89 
Punjab  1.473  1.336  1.251  1.213  1.327 
  (1.85)  (1.63)  (1.48)  (1.37)  (1.58) 
Landlessness  0.0693**  0.0680**  0.0683**  0.0667**  0.0706** 
  (3)  (2.98)  (2.99)  (2.88)  (3.05) 
Food Insecure Districts (1=yes; 0=No)  1.475*  1.462*  1.488*  1.652*  1.251 
  (2.19)  (2.13)  (2.21)  (2.27)  (1.82) 
Number of Madrasssahs per 100,000 Population    0.0376  0.0398  0.0327  0.0421 
    (0.6)  (0.64)  (0.56)  (0.65) 
Employment Rate      –0.0216  –0.00621  –0.0299 
      (–0.68)  (–0.15)  (–0.81) 
Literacy Rate        0.0179   
        (0.52)   
Human Development Index          –3.362 
          (–0.63) 
No. of Observations  87  87  87  87  87 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 14 
Interestingly, the coefficient on both landlessness and food insecurity is 
statistically significant (at 1 percent and 5 percent respectively) even after 
controlling for provincial level fixed characteristics. T he signs are positive 
indicating that both landlessness and food insecurity increases the probability of 
violent attacks. Both these variables are fairly robust even when we include 
other socio-economic variables in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
The number of madrassahs per 100,000 population do not exert a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of violent attacks. This 
finding again supports the Fair (2008) study according to which madrassahs 
are largely irrelevant to militant recruitments. Most of  the militants in her 
study originated from the public schooling system. The employment rate, 
literacy rate, as well as the Human Development Index  (HDI), added in 
column 3, 4 and 5 also do not seem to be associated with the probability of 
violent attacks i n a statistically significant manner. This is quite contrary to 
the general impression held that it is illiteracy and lack of education that 
drives violent conflict. Again, this confirms the findings of Fair (2008) 
study, according to which the households of the slain militants, in a survey 
conducted in Pakistan, were found to be considerably more educated than 
the average population. However, the results of our study must be 
interpreted with caution as the dependent variable corresponds more to the 
incidence of violent conflict and may not relate precisely to the origin of the 
perpetrators of violence. For that purpose, we need a  separate  study 
exploring the socio-economic background of militants and terrorists.  
Table 5 presents the regression results when our dependent variable is 
defined on the basis of the number of people killed in violent attacks. Broadly, 
the results support the findings of our earlier analysis presented in Table 3. The 
provincial dummies of  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are statistically 
significant. Among the socio-economic variables, landlessness rate and food 
insecurity stand out again  in terms of the statistical significance and the 
robustness of their impact.  This is the first ever econometric verification of the 
possible association between landlessness, food insecurity and violent conflict in 
Pakistan. The possibility of an association between landlessness and violent 
conflict was alluded to earlier in a few journalistic articles [see e.g. Perlez and 
Shah (2009) in NewYork Times] but never tested empirically. This finding also 
strengthens the  ‘Horizontal Inequality’  [see Stewart  (2002a,  2002b)] view 
regarding the drivers of violent conflict according to which intergroup inequality 
is one of the most important root causes of violent conflict within the developing 
countries. The possible association between food insecurity and violent conflict 
as pointed out recently by Kugelman and Hathaway (2010) also finds empirical 
support in our study. Certainly, the present study makes a convincing case of the 
need to explore further the role of both landlessness and food insecurity in 
violent conflict in Pakistan.  15 
Table 5 
Logit Regression 
Dependent Variable: Districts having Death toll per 100,000 >0 (Yes=1; No=0) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
Constant  –6.532**  –6.604**  –6.642*  –9.820**  –4.482 
  (–2.79)  (–2.84)  (–2.49)  (–2.75)  (–1.17) 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  4.465***  4.148**  4.158**  4.497***  4.103** 
  (3.81)  (3.28)  (3.21)  (3.4)  (3.21) 
Balochistan  3.348**  3.323**  3.323**  3.676**  3.312** 
  (3.05)  (3.02)  (3.04)  (3.19)  (2.97) 
Punjab  2.589**  2.495**  2.500*  2.576*  2.507** 
  (2.78)  (2.59)  (2.5)  (2.45)  (2.63) 
Landlessness  0.0561*  0.0557*  0.0557*  0.0542  0.0577* 
  (2.01)  (2.05)  (2.05)  (1.93)  (2.14) 
Food Insecure Districts (1=Yes; 0=No)  2.038**  2.037**  2.038**  2.497**  1.715* 
  (2.74)  (2.7)  (2.68)  (2.91)  (2.24) 
Number of Madrasssahs per 100,000 Population    0.0312  0.0311  0.0178  0.0336 
    (0.56)  (0.56)  (0.36)  (0.57) 
Employment Rate      0.000864  0.0309  –0.00718 
      (0.03)  (0.81)  (0.20) 
Literacy Rate        0.0363   
        (1.25)   
Human Development Index          –3.625 
          (–0.84) 
No. of Observations  88  88  88  88  88 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
Empirical evidence on violent conflict across developing countries 
indicates t hat quite often it is the socio-economic deprivation and intergroup 
inequality that drive violent conflict. This study tests this important hypothesis 
in the context of ongoing violent conflict in Pakistan. The intensity of violent 
conflict is measured by the number of violent attacks and the number of people 
killed in these attacks by districts in 2009. While recognising the imperfection of 
this measure to depict fully the origin of violent attacks, the study  provides 
important insights on certain socio-economic factors that need to be explored 
further in the context of ongoing violent conflict in Pakistan. The study uses a 
linear probability model in which the dependent variable is defined on the basis 
of the presence or absence of violent attacks in a particular district. The results 
indicate that in addition to the provincial level fixed characteristics, two socio-
economic variables: landlessness and food insecurity seem to be positively 
associated with the probability of violent attacks across districts in Pakistan. The 
statistical significance of both these variables remains robust to the inclusion of 
other variables such as the number of madrassahs operating in a district; 
employment rate; literacy ratio and the Human Development Index. The overall 
irrelevance of the madrassah factor in driving violent conflict in Pakistan is quite 16 
contrary to the general impression held but supports earlier empirical studies 
conducted on this subject such as that of Fair (2008).  The role of food insecurity 
and landlessness as alluded to in some recent studies on conflict in Pakistan 
certainly finds empirical support in the present study. Future studies on socio-
economic drivers of violent conflict in Pakistan need to explore these aspects 
further. Last but not least, reliable data in the form of mapping of districts by the 
intensity of violent conflict—that measures both the incidence as well as the 
origin of violent conflict—is extremely crucial to corroborate our findings on 
the socio-economic drivers of violent conflict in Pakistan.   
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